A context‐aware approach to defend against unauthorized reading and relay attacks in RFID systems by Ma, Di & Saxena, Nitesh
SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
Security Comm. Networks 2014; 7:2684–2695
Published online 22 December 2011 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI: 10.1002/sec.404SPECIAL ISSUE PAPER
A context-aware approach to defend against
unauthorized reading and relay attacks in RFID systems
Di Ma1* and Nitesh Saxena2
1 University of Michigan-Dearborn, Computer and Information Science, 4901 Evergreen Road, Dearborn, MI 48128, U.S.A.
2 University of Alabama, Birmingham, Computer and Information Sciences, 1300 University Blvd., Birmingham, AL 35294, U.S.A.ABSTRACT
Radio frequency identiﬁcation (RFID) systems are becoming increasingly ubiquitous in both public and private domains.
However, because of the inherent weaknesses of underlying wireless radio communications, RFID systems are plagued with
a wide variety of security and privacy threats. A large number of these threats arise because of the tag’s promiscuous response
to any reader requests. This renders sensitive tag information easily subject to unauthorized reading. Promiscuous tag response
also incites different forms of relay attacks whereby a malicious colluding pair, relaying messages between a tag and a reader,
can successfully impersonate the tag without actually possessing it. Because of the increasing ubiquity of RFID devices, there is
a pressing need for the development of security primitives and protocols to defeat unauthorized reading and relay attacks.
However, currently deployed or proposed solutions often fail to satisfy the constraints and requirements of the underlying RFID
applications in terms of (one or more of) efﬁciency, security, and usability. This paper proposes a novel research direction, one
that utilizes sensing technologies, to tackle the problems of unauthorized reading and relay attacks with a goal of reconciling the
requirements of efﬁciency, security, and usability. The premise of the proposed work is based on a current technological
advancement that enables many RFID tags with low-cost sensing capabilities. The on-board tag sensors will be used to acquire
useful contextual information about the tag’s environment (or its owner, or the tag itself). For defense against unauthorized
reading and relay attacks, such context information can be leveraged in two ways. First, contextual information can be used
to design context-aware selective unlocking mechanisms so that tags can selectively respond to reader interrogations and thus
minimize the likelihood of unauthorized reading and “ghost-and-leech” relay attacks. Second, contextual information can be
used as a basis for context-aware secure transaction veriﬁcation to defend against special types of relay attacks involving
malicious readers. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Low cost, small size, and the ability of allowing computerized
identiﬁcation of objects make radio frequency identiﬁcation
(RFID) systems increasingly ubiquitous in both public and
private domains. Prominent RFID applications include supply
chain management (inventory management) [1], e-passports
[2], credit cards [3], driver’s licenses [4,5], vehicle systems
(toll collection or automobile key) [6–8], access cards (build-
ing or parking, public transport) [9], and medical implants
[10]. Besides numerous existing applications, RFID is consid-
ered as one of the main enabling technologies for the creation
of Internet of Things (IoT)—an entirely new network of net-
works that connects everything, just as how the “traditional”
Internet connects everyone. This new Internet paradigm will
enable innovative forms of ubiquitous communication2684between people and things (e.g., physical objects) as well as
between things themselves, revolutionize the waywe commu-
nicate with our physical environment, and eventually trans-
form the society into a more intelligent one.
A typical RFID system usually consists of tags, readers,
and/or back-end servers. Tags, also called transponders, are
miniaturized wireless radio devices that store information
about their corresponding subject. Such information is usu-
ally sensitive and personal identiﬁable. For example, a US
e-passport stores the name, nationality, date of birth, digital
photograph, and (optionally) ﬁngerprint of its owner [11].
Readers, also known as interrogators, broadcast queries
to tags in their radio transmission ranges for information
contained in tags and tags reply with such information.
The queried information is then sent to the server (which
may co-exist with the reader) for further processing, andCopyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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(such as updating inventory, opening gate, charging toll,
or approving payment).
Because of the inherent weaknesses of underlying
wireless radio communication, RFID systems are plagued
with a wide variety of security and privacy threats [12].
A large number of these threats are due to the tag’s
promiscuous response to any reader requests. This renders
sensitive tag information easily subject to unauthorized
reading [13]. Information (might simply be a plain
identiﬁer) gleaned from an RFID tag can be used to track
the owner of the tag, or be utilized to clone the tag so that
an adversary can impersonate the tag’s owner [12].
Promiscuous response also incites different types of
relay attacks. One class of these attacks is referred to as
“ghost-and-leech” [14]. In this attack, an adversary, called
a “ghost,” relays the information surreptitiously read from
a legitimate RFID tag to a colluding entity known as a
“leech.” The leech can then relay the received information
to a corresponding legitimate reader and vice versa in the
other direction. This way, a ghost and leech pair can
succeed in impersonating a legitimate RFID tag without
actually possessing the device. A more severe form of
relay attacks, usually against payment cards, is called
“reader-and-leech,” it involves a malicious reader using
what the owner intends to make a transaction [15].* In this
attack, the malicious reader, serving the role of a ghost and
colluding with the leech, can fool the owner of the card
into approving a transaction which she did not intend to
make (e.g., paying for a diamond purchase made by the
adversary while the owner only intending to pay for food).
We note that addressing this problem requires secure
transaction veriﬁcation, that is, validation that the tag is
indeed authorizing the intended payment amount. The
feasibility of executing relay attacks has been demonstrated
on many RFID deployments, including the chip-and-PIN
credit card system [15], RFID-assisted voting system [16],
and keyless entry and start car key system [6].
With the increasingly ubiquitous deployment of RFID
applications, there is a pressing need for the development of
security primitives and protocols to defeat unauthorized read-
ing and relay attacks. However, providing security and privacy
services for RFID tags presents a unique and formidable set of
challenges. The inherent difﬁculty stems partially from the
constraints of RFID tags in terms of computation, memory,
and power, and partially from the unusual usability require-
ments imposed by RFID applications (originally geared for
automation). Consequently, solutions designed for RFID sys-
tems need to satisfy the requirements of the underlying RFID
applications in terms of efﬁciency, usability and security.
1.1. Existing countermeasures
Although a ﬂurry of research results has been published,
many of them fail to meet the constraints and requirements*In contrast to “ghost-and-leech” attack, the owner in the “reader-and-
leech” attack is aware of the interrogation from the malicious reader.
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more of) efﬁciency, security, and usability.
Unauthorized reading could be addressed by means of
selective unlocking of tags, that is, tags are made to
respond selectively, rather than promiscuously. Hardware-
based selective unlocking schemes have been proposed.
These include blocker tag [17], RFID enhancer proxy [18],
and RFID guardian [19]. All of these approaches, however,
require the users to carry an auxiliary device (a blocker tag
in [17] and a PDA-like special-purpose RFID-enabled
device in [18,19]); such an auxiliary device may not be
available at the time of accessing RFID tags, and users may
not be willing to carry these devices always. A Faraday cage
can also be used to prevent an RFID tag from responding
promiscuously by shielding its transmission. However, a
special-purpose cage (a foil envelope or a wallet) would be
needed, and the tag would need to be removed from the cage
in order to be read. This greatly decreases the usability of
such solutions as users are not willing to put up with changes
to traditional usage model, given that RFID devices were
meant to make life easier for people. Moreover, building a
true Faraday cage that shields all communication is known
to be a signiﬁcant challenge. For example, a crumpled sleeve
is shown to be ineffective for shielding purposes [20].
Cryptographic reader-to-tag authentication protocols
could also be used to defend against unauthorized reading.
However, because of their computational complexity and
high bandwidth requirements, many of these protocols are
still unworkable even on high-end tags [21]. There has been
a growing interest in the research community to design
lightweight cryptographic mechanisms (e.g., [22–25]).
However, these protocols usually require shared key(s)
between tags and readers, which is not an option in
many applications.
Distance-bounding protocols have been used to thwart
relay attacks [6,15]. A distance-bounding protocol is a
cryptographic challenge-response authentication protocol
that allows the veriﬁer to measure an upper bound of its
distance from the prover [26]. (We stress here that normal
“non-distance-bounding” cryptographic authentication
protocols have no help in defending against relay attacks.)
Using this protocol, a valid RFID reader can verify
whether the valid tag is within a close proximity, thereby
detecting ghost-and-leech and reader-and-leech relay
attacks [6,15]. The upper bound calculated by an RF
distance-bounding protocol, however, is very sensitive to
processing delay (the time used to generate the response)
at the prover side. This is because a slight delay (of the
orders of a few nanoseconds) may result in a signiﬁcant
error in distance bounding. Because of this strict delay
requirement, even XOR-based or comparison-based
distance-bounding protocols [26,27] are not suitable for
RF distance bounding because simply signal conversion
and modulation can lead to signiﬁcant delays. By
eliminating the necessity for signal conversion and
modulation, a very recent protocol, based on signal
reﬂection and channel selection, achieves a processing
time of less than 1 ns at the prover side [28]. However,2685.
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of the need for channel selection. This renders exist-
ing protocols currently infeasible for even high-end
RFID tags.
1.2. Our principles and approaches
In an attempt to address the drawbacks of prior research,
this paper proposes a novel research direction, one that
utilizes sensing technologies, to address unauthorized
reading and relay attacks in RFID systems. The premise
of the proposed work is based on a current technological
advancement that enables many RFID tags with low-cost
sensing capabilities. Various types of sensors have been
incorporated to many RFID tags [29–31]. Intel’s wireless
identiﬁcation and sensing platform (WISP) [32,33] is a
representative example of a sensor-enabled tag that extends
RFID beyond simple identiﬁcation to in-depth sensing.
This new generation of RFID devices can facilitate
numerous promising applications for ubiquitous sensing
and computation [34,35]. They also suggest new ways of
providing security and privacy services by leveraging the
unique properties of physical environment or physical
status of the tag (or its owner). In this paper, we
speciﬁcally focus on the design of context-aware security
primitives and protocols by utilizing sensing technologies
so as to provide improved protection against unauthorized
reading and relay attacks.
The physical environment offers a rich set of attributes
that is unique in space, time, and to individual objects.
These attributes—such as temperature, sound, light,
acceleration, or magnetic ﬁeld—reﬂect either the current
condition of a tag’s surrounding environment or the
condition of the tag (or its owner) itself. A sensor-enabled
RFID tag can acquire useful contextual information about
its environment (or its owner, or the tag itself). Such
contextual information can be leveraged in two ways:
• First, contextual information can be used to design
context-aware selective unlocking mechanisms so that
tags can selectively respond to reader interrogations.
That is, rather than responding promiscuously to
queries from any readers, a tag can leverage upon
“context recognition” and will only communicate when
it makes sense to do so, thus raising the bar even for
sophisticated adversaries without affecting the RFID
usage model, that is, without imposing additional user
burden. For example, an ofﬁce building access card,
equipped with a location sensor, can remain locked
unless it is near the (ﬁxed) entrance of the building.
The following selective unlocking mechanisms will be
explored in Section 2: (i) magnetic ﬁeld-triggered
proximity sensing, (ii) posture recognition, and
(iii) location sensing and location classiﬁcation.
• Second, contextual information can be used as a basis
for context-aware secure transaction veriﬁcation to
defend against special relay attacks involving
malicious readers. For example, a bank server will2686 Securdeny a $2000 transaction when it detects the tag
(RFID credit card) is currently located in a restaurant
where a normal transaction is usually less than $200.
The following two context-aware secure transaction
veriﬁcation schemes will be explored in Section 3:
(i) numeric digit-based speech recognition, and
(ii) location sensing and location classiﬁcation.
The design of context recognition for RFID tags poses
several challenges. First, the resource constraints of RFID
tags hamper the complexity of the algorithms that can be
used to judge what activity a tag is currently undergoing.
Another obstacle is the lack of ways in which users can
interact with their tags. RFID tags, being geared for
automation, were designed to be as transparent as possible
to their users and, as such, lack any input or output
interfaces such as buttons and displays. Moreover, many
users are typically not in direct contact with their tags
because they prefer to keep them inside other objects, such
as wallets or purses [36]. For example, it is a common
practice to swipe one’s wallet containing the tag against
the reader rather than taking the tag out from the wallet
and directly swiping the tag.
1.3. Scope
We note the proposed approach may not provide absolute
security due to the possibility of errors associated with
context recognition; however, it raises the bar even for
sophisticated adversaries without affecting the RFID usage
model. In addition, although the proposed techniques can
work in a stand-alone fashion, they can also be used with
other security mechanisms, such as cryptographic-based
schemes, to provide stronger cross-layer security protection
according to different security needs in various applications.
Moreover, many of the proposed ideas and techniques will
be applicable in the realm of other wireless (or wired)
devices equipped with sensors. Because sensors serve as a
bridge between the physical and the digital world, the
proposed sensing-centric mechanisms will be instrumental
toward providing dependability, security, and privacy for
complex cyber-physical systems.
1.4. Economic constraints
Security comes at a cost. Thus, a fundamental question with
respect to our approaches might be whether the cost of
sensor-enabled tags is acceptable? The cost of RFID tags
is dependent on several factors such as capabilities of
the tag (computation, memory), packaging of the tag (e.g.,
encased in plastic or embedded in a label), and the volume
of tags produced. High-end RFID tags, for example,
those available on e-passports or some of the access
cards that are capable of performing certain cryptographic
computations such as AES or RSA encryption, cost around
$5, whereas low-end inventory tags that do not support any
(cryptographic) computation cost only about $0.20 [37].
(We emphasize that our proposal generally targets high-endity Comm. Networks 2014; 7:2684–2695 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec
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generally require higher level of security and privacy.
Inventory tags, at least for the time being, are not within
the scope of our research.) The current cost of WISP
tags—equipped with a thermometer and an accelerometer—
assembled from discrete components costs roughly $25 but
it is expected that this number will be reduced closer to $1
once they are mass manufactured [38]. This cost is certainly
acceptable for high-end tags and does not affect their business
model. Tag price will not be reduced indeﬁnitely because of
the per-die cost for small ICs. Incorporating sensors on
tags—that is, increasing the capabilities of tags—may raise
the price of tags initially. However, in the long run, following
Moore’s law, advances in process technology and mass
production should enable tags with more capabilities (such
as sensing, increased computation and memory) at the same
cost of today’s tags [36].1.5. Power constraints
Another question we need to answer with respect to the
sensing-based approach is whether the power drawn from
the reader is enough for the tag to perform the proposed
tasks? Because our prototype implementations will be
developed on the WISP platform, we discuss the require-
ments for sensors to work under the power budget of the
WISPs, instead of generic RFID tags. WISP is powered by
the conversion of induced RF power from the reader into
DC voltage (1.8V) in wireless mode [39]. The microcontrol-
ler (MCU)MSP430 on theWISP draws approximately 1mA
running at full speed (200A/MHz). For a sensor to be
integrated with and work on the WISP platform, we have
to take into account the following considerations. First, the
sensor must allow for a supply voltage of 1.8V [39]. Second,
the time and current assumption necessary to make a
measurement/sensing (power-on time + settling time) must
be small [39]. Third, the power required for additional
circuitry essential for interfacing the sensor must be taken
into consideration along with the overall power consumed.
A rough approximation of the energy budget available is
1mA for 1ms; that is, as long as the product of the current
and settling time of the sensor is less than 1mA*1ms, the
sensor can be integrated with the WISP and work under the
power budget. Otherwise, a storage capacitance has to be
added to the WISP to support additional power consumption
request [40]. Apparently, not all types of sensor can be
supported by the power budget of the WISP. However,
low-power sensors that meet the aforementioned require-
ments can potentially work within the induced power on
theWISP, including those previously implemented onWISP
(rectiﬁed voltage, light level, temperature, and acceleration).
Several recent works have successfully integrated additional
sensors on the WISP platform, including capacitive sensor
[40], neural sensor [41], and piezo element (beeper) [42].
Some other sensors that we are interested to explore, and
which meet the aforementioned requirements, include
Honeywell’s HMC1053 3-D magnetometer [43], ServoﬂoSecurity Comm. Networks 2014; 7:2684–2695 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
DOI: 10.1002/secCorporation’s MS5607 pressure sensor [44], and ST’s
MP34DB01 audio sensor (microphone) [45].
Besides choosing the appropriate sensors, we also need
to design efﬁcient context recognition algorithms so that
they can run on the WISP platform. Individual operations
can be further optimized to reduce power consumption.
As an alternative approach, we can use the checkpoint
strategy proposed in [46] to allow a tag to perform
demanding computations despite limited energy and
interruptions of power that lead to complete loss of the
contents of RAM. In short, the idea is for an interrupted
tag to backup its RAM state just before it loses power
(e.g., when the reader becomes out of range of the tag).
When the reader comes in close enough proximity of the
tag, the tag can retrieve its backed-up state and resume
the unﬁnished operations, without having to restart them
from the very beginning.
1.6. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We outline
several possible context-aware selective unlocking
mechanisms based on conventional sensors (accelerometer,
magnetometer, and GPS receiver) in Section 2, where we
also discuss research challenges and applications of each
mechanism. We describe how to build secure transaction
veriﬁcation schemes based on context recognition in
Section 3. We discuss possible attacks targeting sensor-
centric solutions and point out necessary further studies in
Section 4. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.2. CONTEXT-AWARE SELECTIVE
UNLOCKING
The traditional selective unlocking techniques require
special-purpose hardware and/or explicit user involvement
(as discussed in Section 1.1); both greatly decrease the
usability and acceptability of such solutions. To remedy
this, we propose selective unlocking schemes based on
context recognition, focusing not only on security and
privacy, but also on usability.
We ﬁrst review two recent works on selective unlocking
based on context recognition and discuss their merits and
demerits. We next outline possible selective unlocking
mechanisms based on conventional sensors such as
accelerometer, magnetometer (compass), and location
sensors. For each mechanism, we discuss associated design
challenges and also suggest speciﬁc application(s) that
could beneﬁt from it.
2.1. Previous recent work
“Secret Handshakes” is a recently proposed, interesting
selective unlocking method that is based on context
inference [36]. In order to unlock an accelerometer-
equipped RFID tag [32,47] using Secret Handshakes, a
user must move or shake the tag (or its container) in a2687.
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studied and shown to exhibit low error rates [36]. A central
drawback to Secret Handshakes, however, is that a unique
movement pattern is required for each tag to be unlocked.
This requires subtle changes to the expected RFID usage
model, whereas a standard, insecure RFID setup only
requires users to bring their RFID tags within range of a
reader.
Keeping in mind the goal of not incorporating any
usagemodel changes, we have proposed “MotionDetection”
[48] as another selective unlocking scheme. In Motion
Detection, a tag would respond only when it is in motion,
instead of doing so promiscuously. In other words, if the
device is still, it remains silent. This approach hinges on
the straightforward observation that accessing a personal
mobile RFID tag fundamentally involves moving it in some
manner (e.g., swiping an access card in front of the reader).
Although Motion Detection does not require any changes
to the traditional usage model and raise the bar required
for some common attacks to succeed, it is not capable of
discerning whether the device in motion is due to a particular
gesture or because its owner is in motion. Hence, the false
unlocking rate of this approach is high, meaning there is a
high chance that a tag becomes unlocked when it actually
should have been locked.
In the following, we outline several new context-aware
selective unlocking mechanisms that (1) have both low
false locking and false unlocking rates and (2) do not
necessitate any change to the current usage model.2.2. Selective unlocking based on proximity
sensing
Using this mechanism, a tag becomes unlocked whenever
it detects that it is near a reader. The requirement for
tag and reader being near is common in most RFID
applications. For example, while making a payment, users
typically need to bring their contactless credit card (or its
container) closer to the reader for transaction processing.
This requirement can therefore serve as an effective means
to establish a valid context.
One possible way of proximity sensing is through scalar
magnetometers that measure the total strength of the
magnetic ﬁeld they are subjected to. More speciﬁcally, a
magnet would be attached to the reader, and when the tag
is brought close to the reader, the tag’s on-board
magnetometer would sense the magnetic ﬁeld and the tag
would become unlocked if the strength of the magnetic ﬁeld
is above some predeﬁned threshold. If an adversary intends
to unlock a tag, it can simply be in very close proximity of
the tag, similar to a legitimate reader. However, being near
increases the chances of the adversary being detected. To
remain surreptitious, the adversary is therefore forced to
generate a stronger magnetic ﬁeld from an undetectable
distance. Our preliminary investigation shows this attack
does not seem feasible. The law of Biot Savart [49] can be






Here, I is the current ﬂowing through a magnetic source,
vector d‘ is the direction of the current, m0 is the magnetic
constant, r is the distance between the magnetic source and
the location at which the magnetic ﬁeld is being calculated,
and ^r is a unit vector in the direction of r.
In general, the law of Biot Savart states that the
magnetic ﬁeld strength decreases inversely proportional
to the square of the distance from the location of magnetic
source (a current-ﬂowing object or a permanent magnet).
Hence, it is difﬁcult to control ﬁeld strength from a
distance, and magnetic ﬁeld strength detection can be a
promising avenue for proximity sensing.
The size and sensitivity of magnetometers can be very
different. For our purpose, a small magnetometer matching
the size of an RFID tag with a reasonable level of sensitivity
is needed. Tiny, inexpensive atomic magnetometers about
the size of a fat grain of rice have been reported [50]. The
most sensitive types of atomic magnetometers can detect
ﬁelds of the order of a femtotesla (=1015T)—about one
ﬁfty-billionth the strength of Earth’s magnetic ﬁeld.
We also note that iron and steel can cause shielding
effects on magnetic ﬁelds. Other materials such as wood,
Plexiglas, Styrofoam, brass, copper, aluminum, leather, or
paper have almost no effect on shielding magnetic ﬁelds.
This means that a magnetometer can work even when
encased in many objects, such as wallets, purses, or
backpacks. This suggests that a magnetometer-equipped
tag would not need to be removed from its container while
accessing the tag.
2.3. Selective unlocking based on posture
recognition
“Secret Handshakes” described in Section 2.1 is based on
gesture recognition. To unlock an accelerometer-enabled
tag, a user has to move the tag in a special pattern—gesture.
Hence “Secret Handshakes” is obtrusive and requires
explicit user involvement, which is not convenient in a
frequent use and reduces the usability of such approach.
This motivates the need for study posture recognition to
achieve non-obtrusive selective unlocking that does not
require user involvement. We liberally use “posture” to
denote activities performed by users without special
intention but can serve as a valid context in certain
applications. One class of such applications involves
implanted medical devices (IMDs). Under legitimate
IMD access, we can assume that the patient is lying down
on his or her back. Thus, access to the IMD will be granted
only when the patient’s body is in such a predeﬁned
unique posture. This will prevent an attacker from
controlling the IMD in many common scenarios, such
as while standing just behind the patient in public.
Because posture formations are human activities performed
by users unconsciously, posture recognition can provide aity Comm. Networks 2014; 7:2684–2695 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec
Context-aware approach against attacks in RFID systemsD. Ma and N. Saxenaﬁner-grained non-obtrusive unlocking mechanism without
purposeful or conscious user involvement.
Posture recognition is similar to gesture recognition to a
certain extent. Similar to the gesture recognition schemes
(such as the Secret Handshakes scheme [36] we discussed
previously), in a posture recognition scheme, user movement
can be recorded by motion sensors such as accelerometers
and the captured motion data is then compared with a
reference posture template that has been recorded by
performing the corresponding movement in a reference
coordinate system. A match between the captured data and
the reference template implies that the user has exhibited a
certain posture transition deﬁned by the reference template.
However, there is one primary difference between gesture
recognition and posture transition recognition, that is, device
tilt. In (hand) gesture recognition systems, users are assumed
to be aware of their hand activities. So gestures are
performed in a more-or-less controlled way without tilting
the tag so that the effect of tilt can be greatly minimized or
ignored. However, in posture transition recognition, as we
do not require any explicit user involvement, the tag, placed
inside a human body in the form of an IMD or into the
pockets in the form of a car key, can be tilted because of
the movement of human body or the device positioning
itself. The reference template is usually collected in a
reference coordinate system. However, once a device is
tilted, movement data collected from the device are no
longer in the reference coordinate system and the
corresponding posture will not be detected correctly. It is
therefore critical to detect the tag’s orientation in order to
rotate the data vector back to the reference coordinate
system for correct recognition.
Current systems for full orientation estimation, such as
the one in Apple iPad2, usually use a set of sensor
modalities—typically including gyroscopes, accelerometers,
and magnetometers—to estimate device orientation.
Gyroscopes are used to determine accurately angular
changes, whereas the other sensors are used to compensate
the integration drift of the gyroscopes and keep this estimate
drift free. However, a typical gyroscope requires about 5 ~ 10
times more power than magnetometer and accelerometer
together. Moreover, its comparably larger form factor
also makes gyroscope not commonly available in a tiny
single package MEMS systems chip. Considering the
resource-constrained RFID platforms, it might be neces-
sary to restrict from using gyroscopes and instead focus on
using accelerometers and/or magnetometers for device orien-
tation and posture estimation. As integrated accelerometers
and magnetometers are commercially available in tiny
packages, an RFID tag with such sensors can be ﬂat and less
obtrusive for the user, which makes them very attractive to
be used in IMDs or smart car keys. There exist several
attempts to use either accelerometers or magnetometers;
however, it has been shown that neither of the two sensors
is good enough alone to estimate full orientation. On
the other hand, orientation estimation schemes that use
both accelerometers and magnetometers show very promis-
ing results [51,52]. Further study is needed to checkSecurity Comm. Networks 2014; 7:2684–2695 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
DOI: 10.1002/secwhether these schemes (based on both accelerometer and
magnetometer) are efﬁcient enough to be applied on the
RFID platform.
2.4. Selective unlocking based on location
sensing and location classiﬁcation
We notice in quite some applications, (under normal
circumstances) tags only communicate to readers at some
speciﬁc locations. For example, an access card to an ofﬁce
building needs to only respond to reader queries when it is
near the entrance of the building; a credit card should only
work in authorized retail stores (which may be located all
over the world); toll cards usually only communicate with
toll readers in certain ﬁxed locations and when the car
travels at certain speed. Hence, location can serve as a
good means to establish a valid context. That is, a tag is
unlocked only when it is in an appropriate (pre-speciﬁed)
location. It is suitable for applications where reader
location is ﬁxed and well known in advance.
Location information can be easily obtained through
GPS sensors. A new tag from Numerex (Atlanta, GA,
USA) and Savi Technology (Alexandria, VA, USA) has
been equipped with GPS sensors and has the ability to
conduct satellite communications [53]. Researchers in Oak
Ridge National Laboratory also worked with RFID system
suppliers in developing new tags by combining GPS and
environmental sensors [54]. These tags are designed to track
goods anywhere within a global supply chain.
A prerequisite in a location-aware selective unlocking
scheme is that a tag needs to store a list of legitimate
locations beforehand. Upon each interrogation from a
reader, the tag obtains its current location information from
its on-board GPS sensor, compares it with the list of
legitimate locations, and decides whether to switch to the
unlocked state or not. Due to limited on-board storage
(WISP has an 8KB of ﬂash memory) and passive nature
of tags, the list of legitimate locations should be kept short.
Otherwise, testing whether the current location is within
the legitimate list may cause unbearable delay and affect
the performance of the underlying access system.
Moreover, the list of legitimate locations should not
change a lot because otherwise users have to do extra work
to securely update the list on their tags. So selective
unlocking based on pure location information is more
suitable to be used in applications where tags only need
to talk with one or a few readers, such as building access
cards. It may not be suitable for credit card applications
as there is a long list of legitimate retailer stores and store
closing and new store opening happen on a frequent basis.
Selective unlocking based on pure location information
presents similar problems when it is applied to RFID toll
systems since a toll card needs to store a long list of toll booth
locations. We notice vehicles mounted with RFID toll tags
are usually required to travel at a certain speed when they
approach a toll booth. For example, three out of eight toll
lanes on the Port Authority’s New Jersey–Staten Island
Outer Bridge Crossing permit 25mph speeds for E-ZPass2689.
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plaza, NY has 20mph roll-through speed; Dallas North Toll
way has roll-through lanes allowing speeds up to 30mph.
Hence, speed can be used as a valid context to design
selective unlocking mechanisms for toll cards. That is, a toll
card remains in a locked state except when the vehicle is
traveling at a designated speed near a toll booth (such as
25–35mph in the Dallas North Toll Way case). GPS sensors
can be used to estimate speed either directly from the
instantaneous Doppler speed or directly from positional data
differences and the corresponding time differences [55].
One disadvantage with the GPS-based approach is the
reliance on the GPS infrastructure. Thus, selective
unlocking would require the constant accessibility of this
infrastructure. Another disadvantage is potential delay due
to initialization process of GPS receivers. A GPS receiver
can have either a cold start or hot start. The hot start occurs
when the GPS device remembers its last calculated position
and the satellites in view, the almanac (i.e., the information
about all the satellites in the constellation) used, and the
UTC Time, and makes an attempt to lock onto the same
satellites and calculate a new position based upon the
previous information. This is the quickest GPS lock but it
only works if the receiver is generally in the same location
as it was when the GPS was last turned off. The cold start
is when the GPS device dumps all the information, attempts
to locate satellites, and then calculates a GPS lock. This takes
longer time because there is no known or pre-existing
information [56]. The GPS module we are currently
experimenting with can normally acquire a ﬁx from a cold
start in 35 s and a hot-start ﬁx in less than 2 s [57]. For
applications which have extremely low delay tolerance, a
storage capacitor can be added to the tag in order to help
the GPS receiver keep running to avoid cold start [40].
Another disadvantage of the GPS-based approach is that
multiple entities may share the same location information,
which might not be desirable in some cases. For example,
the stores at the same place, but on different levels of a
shopping mall, can share the same altitude and latitude
information. This motivates the need to design a “localized”
approach to location sensing that does not require any
additional infrastructure besides the RFID. One idea is to
make use of (multiple) environmental sensors (such as
microphone, thermometer, or magnetometer, and perhaps
odor and gas sensors) as a means to derive the location-
speciﬁc information. The intuition is that the “localized data”
gathered by these sensors is unique per location (or type of
location, such as an ofﬁce or a hospital), and thus one can
build a classiﬁer that can associate this data with a particular
location. To justify this, we can consider the example of an
access card application. The noise, temperature, and odor
levels, for instance, and their variations within a certain time
frame, at the ofﬁce entrance, and at a nearby cafeteria or
outside the ofﬁce building are likely to be quite different.
Thus, a classiﬁer can be “trained” to acquire unique features
from sensor data gathered at the ofﬁce entrance building. On
every read request (malicious or otherwise), the card will
“test” the classiﬁer on current sensor data and become2690 Securunlocked only on a positive classiﬁcation instance. Another
example is that of an implanted medical tag [42], which will
only become unlocked when the classiﬁer detects it to be
inside a hospital or a doctor’s ofﬁce, which may possess
some unique sensor extracted features.
There exists some prior research that demonstrates the
potential for sensor-based location classiﬁcation [58]. Other
prior work also considers wireless radio receivers to address
a similar problem [59,60]. A number of challenges need
to be addressed in order to realize the RFID location
classiﬁcation approach, however. First, distinct features of
environmental data (a “location ﬁngerprint”) need to be
identiﬁed that remain constant across time, but can be used
to uniquely identify a given location (or a location type).
Second, a simplistic classiﬁer needs to be developed that
can be accommodated within the constraints of an RFID
tag; traditional machine learning classiﬁers may not be
feasible due to their high computational requirements. Third,
the classiﬁer needs to be robust enough to be used in practice,
with low classiﬁcation errors. The location estimation-based
approach may not be as ﬁne grained as the GPS approach.
However, we view it as a much simpler alternative and
believe that it can be employed to provide improved security
in the face of many common attacks.3. CONTEXT-AWARE
TRANSACTION VERIFICATION
A highly difﬁcult problem arises in situations when the
reader itself, with which the tag (or its user) engages in a
transaction, is malicious. For example, in the context of
an RFID credit card, a malicious reader can fool the user
into approving for a transaction whose cost is much more
than what he or she intended to pay. That is, the reader
terminal would still display the actual (intended) amount
to the user, while the tag will be sent a request for a
higher amount. Perhaps more seriously, such a malicious
reader can also collude with a leech and can succeed in
purchasing an itemmuch costlier than what the user intended
to buy [15]. As mentioned in Section 1, addressing this
problem requires secure transaction veriﬁcation, that is,
validation that the tag is indeed authorizing the intended
payment amount. Note that selective unlocking is ineffective
for this purpose because the tag will anyway be unlocked
in the presence of a valid (payment) context.
A display-equipped RFID tag can easily enable secure
transaction veriﬁcation. This, however, necessitates user
involvement because (1) the tag must be taken out of one’s
wallet or purse and (2) the amount displayed on the tag
needs to be validated by the user. Distance-bounding
protocols have also been suggested as a countermeasure
to the reader-and-leech attacks [15]. However, these
protocols are currently infeasible (as also reviewed in
Section 1.1). In this section, we set out to explore whether
sensor-enabled mechanisms can be designed for secure
transaction veriﬁcation.ity Comm. Networks 2014; 7:2684–2695 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec
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tag the intended amount of transaction (instead of the tag
displaying this to the user, which requires direct access
to the tag). Use of touch sensors [31] or on-board buttons
is not feasible for this purpose as they would also
require direct tag access; buttons will also hamper tag’s
form factor. Secret Handshakes [36] could be extended
nevertheless. The user could create numeric patterns
depicting the amount by moving his or her accelerometer-
enabled tag (or wallet containing the tag). For example, user
can create a “5” and then two “0”s up in the air to indicate a
transaction worth $500. This method, however, has the same
shortcomings as Secret Handshakes—it requires explicit
user involvement and has usability implications. Another,
potentially more user-friendly, solution is to have the user
speak-out the amount of transaction (e.g., digit-by-digit),
which the tag can record using an on-board microphone
and decode. This method requires some form of numeric
speech (digit) recognition.
In order to provide improved resilience, speciﬁcally, to
reader-and-leech attacks, location sensing could be used.
Note that under such attacks, the valid tag and the valid
reader would usually not be in close proximity (e.g., the
tag is at a restaurant, while the reader is at a jewelry shop
[15]). This is unlike normal circumstances whereby the
two entities would be at the same location, physically near
to each other. Thus, a difference between the locations of
the tag and that of the reader would imply the presence
of such attacks. Speciﬁcally, the tag (credit card) detects
its current location and sends this location information
encrypted with the key that it pre-shares with its issuing
bank; the bank will then compare the tag’s location with
that of the (jewelry) merchant and reject the transaction if
the two mismatch. We note that such a solution can be
deployed, with minor changes on the side of the issuer
bank, under the current payment infrastructure, where
cards share individual keys with their issuer banks (as
discussed in [15]). As presented in Section 2, GPS-enabled
tags could be used for determining the tag’s location.
Similarly, the location classiﬁcation approach described
in previous section can also be employed; here the
classiﬁer will be executed by the bank’s server—not by
the tag locally as in selective unlocking—to “test” for tag’s
location against reader’s location. We note that this
solution will raise the bar against reader-aided relay attacks
because it forces the attacker to be in the same location as
the tag’s owner in order to be successful.4. POSSIBLE ATTACKS AND
FURTHER STUDIES
In previous sections, we have presented our ideas on how
to use various sensing technologies to design new defense
mechanisms for enhanced RFID security and privacy. In
this section, we tentatively evaluate the security of this
sensor-centric approach, discuss potential attacks against
it, and point out necessary further studies.Security Comm. Networks 2014; 7:2684–2695 © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
DOI: 10.1002/secThe security of our sensing-enabled defense mechanisms
clearly depends on the (in) capability of an adversary to
either directly control the sensors or manipulate the
environment in which the sensors operate. In our discussion,
we assume that tampering or corrupting the tag and its
sensors physically is not possible, or can be easily detected.
Rather, we concentrate on indirect control of sensors by
means of a malicious reader, given that the reader is
what powers up the sensors. Additionally, we consider
malicious manipulation of sensor’s environment in order to
compromise the security of the underlying mechanism. It
is intuitive that tampering with the localized physical
environment is a difﬁcult task, for example, when compared
with tampering the wireless radio environment (a property
which is a foundation for our proposal). At the same time,
it is still important to understand the level of security
provided by our mechanisms against localized attackers
and to identify the mechanisms that remain most resistant
in the face of such attackers.
4.1. Manipulation via malicious reader
Radio frequency identiﬁcation tags and associated sensors
are utterly dependent on reader transmissions for energy. A
malicious entity that gains control of an RFID reader could
thus trivially perform a denial-of-service (DoS) attack by
simply refusing to supply enough power for the sensor to
operate. Rather than a DoS attacker, in our evaluation,
we consider a more clever opponent that may attempt to
manipulate on-board tag sensors by subtly adjusting reader
parameters. One such attribute is the rate at which a reader
issues requests to tags. If an RFID protocol requires that a
tag samples its sensor data each time it wakes up, an
attacker could manipulate the rate at which samples are
taken by changing the frequency at which a reader issues
queries. This may have undesirable consequences from a
security perspective. Sensor readings taken at different
periods may contain more or less entropy, for instance.
Along the same lines, an adversary could modify the
signal strength of an RFID reader’s transmissions in order
to change the amount of power that is made available to
tags. Because some tag hardware requires more power to
operate than others, this could potentially alter the behavior
of sensing hardware. A sensor may not operate correctly,
and its output may be less accurate or more predictable
when it is supplied with less power than its designers
intended.
Further studies are needed to understand the impact
of manipulations on proposed sensor-centric security
solutions via malicious readers.
4.2. Environmental manipulation
Our mechanisms that are based on sensor data extracted
from the environment are subject to environmental
manipulation. So whether is it possible for the adversary
to control the environment in such a way that
compromises the security of the mechanism? We discuss2691.
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some of our proposed approaches.
First, let us consider the selective unlocking approach
based on proximity sensing (Section 2). Here, if an
adversary can trigger a sufﬁciently high-strength magnetic
ﬁeld near the tag, it can unlock the tag without its owner’s
consent. Clearly, if the adversary can be very close to the
tag, it can unlock the tag, similar to a legitimate reader,
by making use of a simple magnet. However, being in
physical proximity of the owner increases the likelihood
of detection. Thus, in order to remain clandestine, the
adversary must produce a magnetic ﬁeld of signiﬁcant
strength from a distance. We will conduct an in-depth
study exploring the possibility of such attacks. Our
preliminary research suggests that it is not possible to induce
strong magnetic ﬁeld from a distance. This is because the
magnetic ﬁeld strength goes down drastically with distance
(Equation (1)).†This formula suggests that if an attacker wants
to generate a ﬁeld with a strength of, for example, 700G
at 20m away, it would need to generate a ﬁeld with a
strength of roughly 700*202=28T at the source (magnet)
(1G=104 T). A magnetic ﬁeld of 28 Tesla is a large
number, given that a magnetic resonance imaging electro-
magnet is only 3T. The formula also suggests that it will take
a wire carrying a large amount of current (more than 1000A)
in order generate a magnetic ﬁeld strength of just 200mT even
from a distance of 1m. A current of 1000Awill be impossible
to induce even for a sophisticated attacker (as a reference, a
current of about 1A can cause electrocution).
The GPS-based approach relies heavily on the GPS
infrastructure and thus may also be prone to the GPS-
associated vulnerabilities [61–63]. In the context of
location-aware selective unlocking or location-aware
transaction veriﬁcation, the adversary can unlock the tag
or fool the server if it can feed GPS sensors with the
valid location information (ofﬁce building for an access
card, for example). Of existing GPS attack counter-
measures [64–66], the one that is mostly suitable to be
applied in our RFID sensor setting is the scheme proposed
in [66]. This scheme does not require any special
hardware and not rely on any cryptography. Instead, a
GPS receiver in this scheme uses inertial sensors (i.e.,
altimeters, odometers, speedometers) and algorithms to
measure the discrepancy between its own predicated
location and measured location (through received GPS
signals) to detect spooﬁng and replay attacks. It is thus
interesting to explore further on whether this sensor-
based countermeasure can be seamlessly integrated on a
sensor-enabled tag.†As a special case of this equation, when the magnetic source is an in-
ﬁnitely long, straight wire running a current I, the magnetic ﬁeld
strength decreases inversely proportional to the distance r from the
location of magnetic source, that is, B ¼ m0I2pr ; in another case, when
the magnetic source is a permanent magnet or a dipole, the magnetic
ﬁeld strength decreases inversely proportional to the cube of the
distance, that is, B ¼ m04p 2mr3 (m is the magnetic moment at the source).
2692 SecurIn the context of the location classiﬁcation approach
using environmental sensors (Sections 2 and 3), the
attacker would need to create environmental data that
correspond to that of a valid location. This may require
tinkering with the surrounding temperature, magnetic ﬁeld
or noise, and so on. Common sense suggests that doing so
would be difﬁcult, if not impossible, without being
detected. A detailed investigation will be conducted to rule
out any feasible attack vectors that could be exploited even
by a sophisticated adversary.5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING
REMARKS
In this paper, we proposed a new research direction to
address the issues of unauthorized reading and relay attacks
in sensing-enabled RFID systems. The overarching idea
was to utilize on-board sensors to provide RFID systems
with context-aware intelligence for improved security and
privacy awareness.We argued the feasibility of our approach
in terms of both technical and economical aspects. We
presented our ideas on the design of multiple context-aware
selective unlocking mechanisms to prevent unauthorized
reading and “ghost-and-leech” attacks. We also showed
how secure transaction veriﬁcation schemes can be built
based upon context recognition to defend against “reader-
and-leech” relay attacks involving malicious readers. We
also discussed potential attacks targeting this sensor-centric
approach and pointed out further studies that are needed
to fully understand the level of security provided by
sensor-centric mechanisms.
We believe that the proposed research direction can
have a signiﬁcant impact on the security and privacy
aspects of sensing-enabled RFID systems. Especially, the
proposed solutions (once realized), having been designed
with the usability requirements of an RFID system in mind,
have the potential to be put to use by the general user
population. Moreover, although the proposed techniques
can work in a stand-alone fashion, they can also be used
with other security mechanisms, such as cryptographic-
based schemes, to provide stronger cross-layer security
protection according to different security needs in various
applications.REFERENCES
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